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AN OVERVIEW OF THE NEWLY ADOPTED 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT DEFINITION OF 
THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION 
 
Jennifer Trahan
*
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
From May 31 to June 11, 2010, a significant event occurred in Kampala, 
Uganda: the first ever Review Conference to consider amendments to the 
International Criminal Court’s Statute. At the conference, agreement was 
reached by States Parties to the International Criminal Court (“ICC”) to 
adopt an amendment to the Rome Statute,
1
 adding, inter alia, the definition 
of the crime of aggression as well as conditions for the ICC’s exercise of 
jurisdiction over it.
2
    
The fact that States Parties reached this agreement was a significant 
advancement for the rule of law.  Over the years, many States Parties 
supported these negotiations, including some of the U.S.’s closest allies.3   
States Parties also expressed broad support for the amendment during the 
                                                 
*
Assistant Clinical Professor of Global Affairs, N.Y.U.-S.C.P.S.  Professor Trahan 
attended negations on the crime of aggression, including the International Criminal Court 
Review Conference in Kampala, Uganda, as an NGO observer for the Association of the 
Bar of the City of New York, a member of the American Bar Association 2010 
International Criminal Court Task Force, and Chair of the American Branch of the 
International Law Association International Criminal Court Committee.  These remarks 
were originally delivered as a speech on April 1, 2011, at St. John’s School of Law, as part 
of a symposium entitled “Challenges to International Law, Challenges from International 
Law:  New Realities and the Global Order.” 
1
 “Rome Statute” refers to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. 
Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (July 17, 1998), 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute].  The 
Rome Statute requests the U.N. Secretary-General to convene a Review Conference to 
consider amendments to the Statute seven years after its entry into force.  See id., art. 
123(1).   
2
 The text of the amendment can be found at Resolution RC/Res.6, advance version, 28 
Jun 2010, available at www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/Resolutions/RC-Res.6-ENG.pdf. 
[last visited Mar. 8, 2012].  
3
 The U.K., Australia, France, Germany and Japan, for example, are all Rome Statute 
States Parties.  See International Criminal Court, “The States Parties to the Rome Statute,” 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ASP/states+parties/.  All of these countries to one degree or 
another have been supportive of the crime of aggression negotiations.  France and the U.K. 
took a strong position on what should be the role of the Security Council (discussed 
below), and Japan, in particular, expressed concern about the process by which the 
amendment was accomplished (also discussed below).  But, at a minimum, none of these 
states opposed adoption of the crime of aggression amendment, which was ultimately done 
by consensus vote, meaning that any one of them could have blocked the adoption.  
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2010 session of the Assembly of States Parties (“ASP”).4   This support for 
adoption of the crime of aggression is not shared by all states, and, even 
among States Parties, there is no doubt some diversity of views as to the 
merits of the final agreement. 
While not the focus of this essay, it is worth noting the two other 
amendment proposals at issue during the Review Conference.  One related 
to adding certain war crimes that had previously been covered if committed 
during international armed conflict; they now would become ICC war 
crimes if committed during non-international armed conflict.
5
   The other 
proposal was to delete existing article 124 from the Rome Statute. That 
article provides that when a State Party initially ratifies the Rome Statute it 
may exercise an opt out of war crimes jurisdiction for seven years.
6
 The 
proposal to add the additional war crimes was also adopted,
7
 while voting 
on article 124 was deferred.
8
 
Also on the Review Conference agenda was a “stocktaking” of the field 
of international justice consisting of four panels on: (i) the impact of the 
Rome Statute system on victims and affected communities, (ii) peace and 
justice; (iii) complementarity, and (iv) cooperation.
9
  
                                                 
4
 See Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court, December 6-10, 2010, Ninth Session, ICC-ASP/9/20.  Notes of statements by States 
Parties on file with the author.  
5
 See  Rev. Conf. of the Rome Statute, 12th plenary meeting, June 10, 2010, I.C.C. 
Doc RC/Res.5, Annex 1, available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ 
Resolutions/RC-Res.5-ENG.pdf. 
6
 Article 124 states:   
Notwithstanding article 12, paragraphs 1 and 2, a State, on becoming a 
party to this Statute, may declare that, for a period of seven years after 
the entry into force of this Statute for the State concerned, it does not 
accept the jurisdiction of the Court with respect to the category of crimes 
referred to in article 8 when a crime is alleged to have been committed by 
its nationals or on its territory . . . . The provisions of this article shall be 
reviewed at the Review Conference convened in accordance with article 
123, paragraph 1.   
Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 124. Only Chile and France have utilized this provision. 
7
 See R.C. Res. 5, supra note 6. 
8 For discussion of the decision not to delete article 124, see Roger S. Clark, 
Amendments to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Considered at the 
First Review Conference on the Court, Kampala, 31 May - 11 June 2010, 2 GOETTINGEN J. 
INT’L L. 689, 691–92 (2010). 
9
 See, e.g., Press Release, International Criminal Court, Stocktaking of International 
Criminal Justice: Peace and Justice (Mar. 6, 2010), available at 
http://www.icccpi.int/Menus/-ASP/Press+Releases/Press+Releases+2010/Stocktaking 
+of+international-+criminal+justice_+Peace+and+Justice.htm. While it was significant to 
hold these panels, ultimately, their importance depends on the extent to which they 
motivate continued, sustained State Party involvement in these areas. 
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I. HISTORICAL PRECEDENT FOR THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION 
The idea of prosecuting the crime of aggression is hardly new.  The U.S. 
spearheaded such prosecutions before the International Military Tribunal at 
Nuremberg and the International Military Tribunal for the Far East 
(Tokyo).
10
 The Nuremberg Tribunal deemed “crimes against peace” to be 
“the supreme international crime, only differing from other war crimes in 
that it contains within itself the accumulated evil of the whole.”11    
The prohibition of aggressive use of force is, of course, also enshrined 
in the U.N. Charter. Article 2(4) precludes use of force against the 
“territorial integrity” or “political independence” of any state.12 Two key 
exceptions are authorized U.N. Security Council Chapter VII enforcement 
actions,
13
 and the use of individual or collective self-defense authorized 
under article 51.
14
    
Thus, the notion that aggressive use of force is both: (1) prohibited, as it 
is under the U.N. Charter, and (2) a crime, as was recognized by the 
Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals, rests on sound historical foundation.  
After Nuremberg, however, the crime admittedly fell into disuse; we see 
neither similar prosecutions nor similar tribunals created.
15
   The most one 
                                                 
10
 The Tokyo Tribunal was U.S.-dominated.  The Nuremberg Tribunal was originally 
established by the U.S., U.K., France and U.S.S.R. in the London Charter of the 
International Military Tribunal, August 8, 1945.  See International Law Commission, 
Principles of International Law Recognized in the Charter of the Nüremberg Tribunal and 
in the Judgment of the Tribunal, 1950; see also Zang Wanghong, From Nuremberg to 
Tokyo: Some Reflections on the Tokyo Trial (On the Sixtieth Anniversary of the  Trials), 27 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1673, 1676 (2006) (comparing America’s unilateral domination of the 
Tokyo Tribunal, the statute of which was drafted entirely by America, to the Nuremberg 
Charter, backed by the four Allied powers). 
11
 See 1 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL 
MILITARY TRIBUNAL 171, 186 (1946), available at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military 
_Law /pdf/NT _Vol-1.pdf. 
12
 Article 2(4) states: “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from 
the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any 
state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”  
13
 See  U.N. Charter, ch. VII (enumerating actions the U.N. may take with respect to 
threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression). 
14
 See U.N. Charter, art. 51 (reserving the right of self-defense for U.N. members in the 
event of an armed attack).  A third use of force that some would argue to be implicitly 
allowable under the U.N. Charter is humanitarian intervention, although admittedly there is 
no express provision in the Charter providing for it.  Recent formulations of the 
“responsibility to protect” doctrine, however, suggest that forceful humanitarian 
intervention still should receive Security Council authorization.  See, e.g., 2005 World 
Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1, ¶¶ 138–39, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/1 (Sept. 16, 2005) 
(recognizing Security Counsel authority to decide on a case-by-case basis whether to 
intervene). 
15
 There were no international tribunals created after the Nuremberg and Tokyo 
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sees is the U.N. General Assembly, in 1974, defining aggression for 
purposes of giving guidance to the Security Council, in G.A. resolutions 
3314.
16
    
 
A.  The Rome Statute’s “Placeholder” & Ensuing Negotiations 
In 1998, however, a very significant decision was made in finalizing the 
Rome Statute:  there would be four crimes over which the ICC would have 
jurisdiction—genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and the crime 
of aggression.
17
 But the Rome Statute created something of a “placeholder” 
as to the crime of aggression.  Article 5(2) of the Statute provided that 
before the ICC may exercise jurisdiction over the crime, both the definition 
and conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction needed to be adopted.
18
    
Following agreement on the Rome Statute, over 10 years of negotiations 
on these topics ensued,
19
 first before the Preparatory Commission of the 
                                                                                                                            
Tribunals until the creation by the U.N. Security Council in 1993 and 1994 respectively of 
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.  See S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 5, 1993) 
(establishing the Yugoslav Tribunal); see also S.C. Res. 955, U.N. Doc. S/RES/995 (Nov. 
8, 1994) (establishing the Rwanda Tribunal).  Because collective Security Council action 
was generally blocked by Soviet-U.S. rivalry during the Cold War, it is only with the 
demise of the Cold War that the creation of such tribunals through the Security Council 
became possible. 
16
 See G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), Annex, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/3314 (XXIX) (Dec. 14, 1974).  Numerous states also came to incorporate the crime 
of aggression, in one form or another, into their domestic criminal codes.  See Astrid 
Reisinger Coracini, National Legislation on Individual Responsibility for Conduct 
Amounting to Aggression, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE:  LAW AND PRACTICE 
FROM THE ROME STATUTE TO ITS REVIEW 547–48, n. 29 (Roberto Bellelli ed., 2010). 
17
 See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 5(1) (“The jurisdiction of the Court shall be 
limited to the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole.  
The Court has jurisdiction in accordance with this Statute with respect to the following 
crimes:  (a) [t]he crime of genocide; (b) [c]rimes against humanity; (c) [w]ar crimes; [and] 
(d) [t]he crime of aggression.”) (emphasis added). 
18
 Article 5(2) of the Rome Statute stated: “The Court shall exercise jurisdiction over 
the crime of aggression once a provision is adopted in accordance with articles 121 and 123 
defining the crime and setting out the conditions under which the Court shall exercise 
jurisdiction with respect to this crime.  Such a provision shall be consistent with the 
relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.” See Rome Statute, supra note 1, 
art. 5(2).  This provision was deleted at the Review Conference. 
19
 Indeed, negotiations on the crime of aggression even preceded agreement on the 
Rome Statute.  Certain drafting work as to the crime occurred before and in Rome, with a 
number of state proposals and a working group just prior to the Rome Conference. 
Interview with Jutta Bertram-Nothnagel, Permanent Representative of the Union 
Internationale des Avocats to the International Criminal Court.  
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International Criminal Court in the years 1999 to 2002,
20
 then before the 
Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression (“SWGCA”) from 
2003 to 2009,
21
 and finally at remaining Assembly of States Parties 
meetings prior to the Review Conference.
22
    
The U.S. chose not to attend the meetings of the Special Working Group 
on the Crime of Aggression. The U.S., of course, is a non-State Party to the 
ICC Statute, but was nonetheless able to attend and participate in these 
negotiations—Russia and China (also non-States Parties) did.23 The 
decision not to attend the negotiations was made by the U.S. under the past 
administration. It did, however, put the U.S. at a distinct disadvantage when 
the Obama administration decided the U.S. should join the negotiations.
24
 
The U.S. negotiating team had missed a key period of time when essentially 
both the definition and elements of the crime
25
 had been agreed upon.
26
   
                                                 
20
 The Preparatory Commission was created by Resolution F of the Final Act of the 
United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of An 
International Criminal Court. See U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/10 (July 17, 1998), available at 
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N98/241/85/PDF/N/9824185.pdf?   
Open Element. 
21
 These negotiations were masterfully chaired by Leichtenstein Permanent 
Representative of the ICC Assembly of State Parties, H.E. Christian Wenaweser and 
H.R.H. Prince Zeid Ra-ad Al-Hussein, Ambassador of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan 
to the U.N., with the extremely able assistance of Leichtenstein Deputy Permanent 
Representative Stefan Barriga.    
22
 Once the Special Working Group’s mandate ended, discussions on the crime of 
aggression continued at the Eighth Session of the Assembly of State Parties of the 
International Criminal Court (in The Hague, in November 2009), and the Resumed Eighth 
Session of the Assembly of State Parties of the International Criminal Court (at The U.N., 
in March 2010). See International Criminal Court, Report of the Working Group on the 
Review Conference – Resumed Eighth Session (July 10, 2009), available at 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/RC2010/OR-ASPR8-Annex.II-ENG.pdf;   
see also International Criminal Court, Assembly of State Parties, Annotated List of Items 
Included in the Provisional Agenda, ICC-ASP/8/48/Add.1/Rev.1 (Mar. 18, 2010), 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP8R/ICC-ASP-8-48-Add.1-Rev.1-ENG.pdf.  
23
 Observations of the author, meetings of the SWGCA in Princeton, N.J. The Russian 
delegation participated in the negotiations, although the Chinese delegation primarily did 
not.  See International Criminal Court, Assembly of State Parties, Informal Inter-Session 
Meeting of the Crime of Aggression, Hosted by the Liechtenstein Institute on Self-
Determination, Woodrow Wilson School at the Princeton Club, ICC-ASP/8/INF.2 (July 10, 
2009), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ SWGCA/ICC-ASP-5-
SWGCA-INF1_English.pdf.  
24
 The U.S. delegation attended the Eighth Session of the ASP and attended and 
participated in the Resumed Eighth Session, both of which occurred after the completion of 
the work of the SWGCA.  
25
 The elements of the crime of aggression were also adopted at the Kampala Review 
Conference.  The elements of the crime of aggression are as follows: 
1. The perpetrator planned, prepared, initiated or executed an act of aggression. 
2. The perpetrator was a person in a position effectively to exercise control over or to 
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II. THE AGREEMENT REACHED AT THE REVIEW CONFERENCE 
A.  The Definition of the Crime of Aggression 
While there were many complex issues discussed over the years of 
negotiations as to both the definition and conditions for the exercise of 
jurisdiction,
27
 this essay will highlight a few key provisions of the final 
agreement reached. 
In terms of the definition, as befitting its historical roots, the language 
primarily consists of an amalgamation of text from the U.N. Charter, the 
London Charter establishing the Nuremberg Tribunal,
28
 and U.N. General 
Assembly resolution 3314.
29
  The definition consists of both a definition of 
                                                                                                                            
direct the political or military action of the State which committed the act of 
aggression. 
3. The act of aggression – the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, 
territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other 
manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations – was committed. 
4. The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established that such a 
use of armed force was inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations. 
5. The act of aggression, by its character, gravity and scale, constituted a manifest 
 violation of the Charter of the United Nations. 
6. The perpetrator was aware of the factual circumstances that established such a 
 manifest violation of the Charter of the United Nations. 
Resolution RC/Res.6, supra note 2, at Annex II.  
26
 What had been the definition of the crime by the time of the final SWGCA meeting 
became the definition adopted at the Review Conference.  See Stefan Barriga & Leena 
Grover, Current Developments: A Historic Breakthrough on the Crime of Aggression, 105 
AM. J. INT’L L. 517, 521 (2011) (discussing the historical development of the definition of 
the crime of aggression). 
27
 It is beyond the scope of this essay to discuss all of the details of the definition’s 
text.  For the most comprehensive compilation of the work of the Special Working Group, 
see THE PRINCETON PROCESS ON THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION: MATERIALS OF THE SPECIAL 
WORKING GROUP ON THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION, 2003-2009 (Stefan Barriga et al. eds., 
2009) [hereinafter THE PRINCETON PROCESS].  For discussion of the various competing 
proposals presented during the Review Conference, see Jennifer Trahan, The Rome 
Statute’s Amendment on the Crime of Aggression: Negotiations at the Kampala Review 
Conference, 11 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 49 (2011) [hereinafter Kampala Negotiations].  For an 
article raising concerns about the definition, see Michael J. Glennon, The Blank-Prose 
Crime of Aggression, 35 YALE J. INT’L L. 71 (2010).  This author believes that many of 
Glennon’s concerns are overstated or based on a mistaken reading of the definition.  See 
Jennifer Trahan, A Meaningful Definition Of The Crime Of Aggression: A Response To 
Michael Glennon, 33 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 101 (forthcoming 2012). 
28
 The “London Charter” refers to the London Charter of the International Military 
Tribunal. See Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 
82 U.N.T.S. 279 [hereinafter “London Charter”]. 
29
 See G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/3314 (Dec. 14, 1974). 
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the “crime of aggression” (that is, the act that the individual would commit), 
in paragraph 1, as well as the “act of aggression” (that is, the act that the 
state would commit), in paragraph 2. 
The crime of aggression covers: 
8. bis. 1.  . . . the planning, preparation, initiation or 
execution, by a person in a position effectively to exercise 
control over or to direct the political or military action of a 
State, of an act of aggression which, by its character, gravity 
and scale, constitutes a manifest violation of the Charter of 
the United Nations.
30
  
A few key features are of note. 
1.  Planning, preparation, initiation or execution covered 
First, the relevant verbs in the definition of the crime are “planning, 
preparation, initiation or execution.” These words basically are taken from 
the definition used in the Nuremberg Charter.
31
  
 
2.  The leadership nature of the crime 
Second, the crime would only cover “a person in a position effectively 
to exercise control over or to direct the political or military action of a 
State.”32 This means that the crime is a “leadership” crime, one that would 
not cover ordinary armed forces or even those fairly high up the chain of 
command.
33
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
30
 Resolution RC/Res.6, advance version, supra note 2, at Annex 1 [hereinafter “New 
Def.”], art. 8bis, para. 1. 
31The London Charter defined “crimes against peace” as: “planning, preparation, 
initiation or waging of a war of aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties, 
agreements or assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the 
accomplishment of any of the foregoing.” London Charter, supra note 28, Art. 6(a) 
(emphasis added). 
32
 See New Def., supra note 30, art. 8bis, para. 1.   
33
 Not all “leaders” would be covered, but only those “in a position effectively to 
exercise control over or to direct the political or military action of a State.”  New Def., 
supra note 30, art. 8bis, para. 1. A corollary amendment to Rome Statute article 25 
(individual criminal responsibility) was also agreed upon at the Review Conference.  It 
would add a new 3bis to article 25(3):  “In respect of the crime of aggression, the 
provisions of this article shall apply only to persons in a position effectively to exercise 
control over or to direct the political or military action of a State.”  New Def., supra note 
30, Annex I, para. 5. 
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3.  Requiring a “manifest” U.N. Charter violation 
Third, the crime covers an “act of aggression, which, by its character, 
gravity and scale, constitutes a manifest violation” of the U.N. Charter.34   
Thus, there is a “threshold” that would need to be satisfied:  there must be a 
“manifest” Charter violation.  To evaluate what is a “manifest” violation, 
one would examine the “character, gravity and scale” of the state’s act.35   
Accordingly, state uses of force of insufficient “gravity” or “scale,” such as 
de minimis border incursions, would be excluded.
36
   State uses of force 
without the “character” to constitute a manifest Charter violation also would 
be excluded, thereby excluding humanitarian intervention, admittedly, a 
legal “grey area.”37    
 
B. The Definition of the Act of State of Aggression 
The next paragraph defines the state act of aggression.  It states: 
2. “act of aggression” means the use of armed force by a 
State against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political 
independence of another State, or in any other manner 
inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations. . . .
38
    
                                                 
34
 See New Def., supra note 30, art. 8bis, para 1 (emphasis added). 
35
 The requirement of examining all three criteria (or at least two of the three criteria), 
and that no single criterion could suffice, is further emphasized by Understanding 7, also 
adopted at the Review Conference. Understanding 7 provides:  “the three components of 
character, gravity and scale must be sufficient to justify a ‘manifest’ determination. No one 
component can be significant enough to satisfy the manifest standard by itself.” Resolution 
RC/Res.6, advance version, Annex III, Understanding 7.  
36
 Thus, for example, “the requirement that the character, gravity and scale of an act of 
aggression amount to a manifest violation of the Charter would ensure that a minor border 
skirmish would not be a matter for the Court to take up.”  See THE PRINCETON PROCESS, 
supra note 27, at 8. 
37
 See ROBERT CRYER, HAKAN FRIMAN, DARRYL ROBINSON & ELIZABETH 
WILMSHURST, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 
322 (2010) (“There is controversy over whether there is also an exception for humanitarian 
intervention.”); see also Claus Kress, Time for Decision: Some Thoughts on the Immediate 
Future of the Crime of Aggression: A Reply to Andreas Paulus, 20 EUR. J. INT'L L. 1129, 
1140 (“[T]he international legality of a genuine humanitarian intervention, such as the 
1999 NATO air campaign in Kosovo, is also open to genuine debate, and is thus excluded 
from the scope of [then] draft Article 8bis of the ICC Statute.”).  The U.S.'s proposed 
understanding that “humanitarian intervention” be excluded from the definition, however, 
was not adopted at the Review Conference. See Trahan, Kampala Negotiations, supra note 
27, at 73–78 (2011) (discussing the U.S.'s proposed understandings and those that were 
adopted).  
38
 See New Def., supra note 30, art. 8bis, para. 2. 
Winter 2012]  ICC CRIME OF AGGRESSION 39 
This language basically tracks the text of article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter.
39
 
Then, there is a list of acts that would constitute an “act of aggression”: 
a) The invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of the territory 
of another State, or any military occupation, however temporary, 
resulting from such invasion or attack, or any annexation by the use 
of force of the territory of another State or part thereof; 
b) Bombardment by the armed forces of a State against the territory of 
another State or the use of any weapons by a State against the 
territory of another State; 
c) The blockade of the ports or coasts of a State by the armed forces of 
another State; 
d) An attack by the armed forces of a State on the land, sea or air 
 forces, or marine and air fleets of another State; 
e) The use of armed forces of one State which are within the territory 
of another State with the agreement of the receiving State, in 
contravention of the conditions provided for in the agreement or any 
extension of their presence in such territory beyond the termination 
of the agreement; 
f) The action of a State in allowing its territory, which it has placed at 
the disposal of another State, to be used by that other State for 
perpetrating an act of aggression against a third State; 
g) The sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, 
irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force 
against another State of such gravity as to amount to the acts listed 
above, or its substantial involvement therein.
40
   
 
To the extent that any of these acts would be authorized by the Security 
Council or constitute individual or collective “self-defense,” they would not 
be covered, as they would not satisfy the requirements of paragraph 1 
(“crime of aggression”).  Similarly, the acts expressly listed would still be 
subject to the threshold in paragraph 1, that there must be a “manifest” 
violation of the Charter, which would exclude any de minimis or legally 
debatable acts, even if listed.
41
   
                                                 
39
 Article 2(4) does not, however, include the word “sovereignty.” See U.N. Charter 
art. 2, para. 4.  U.N. General Assembly Resolution 3314, by contrast, does. See G.A. Res. 
3314 (XXIX), supra note 29. 
40
 See New Def., supra note 30, art. 8bis, para.2. The list is preceded by the following 
language: “[a]ny of the following acts, regardless of a declaration of war, shall, in 
accordance with United Nations General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX) of 14 
December 1974, qualify as an act of aggression.” Id.    
41
 Additional provisions in the Rome Statute that protect against bringing legally 
borderline cases include: (i) Article 31(3)’s exclusion of criminal responsibility if conduct 
is permissible under applicable law; (ii) Article 21’s inclusion of principles and rules of 
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C.  The Conditions for the Exercise of Jurisdiction 
Turning to the issue of the conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction, 
this was a topic heatedly debated over the more than ten years of 
negotiations.  Basically, two primary competing positions developed.
42
 One 
was basically advanced by the permanent members of the Security Council 
and their supporters.  They took the position that article 39 of the U.N. 
Charter states that the Security Council determines what is a “threat to the 
peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression,”43 and, therefore, the 
Security Council must be the only body capable of referring an ICC 
aggression prosecution.  Other states generally responded to this argument 
that article 39 is in the context of Chapter VII of the Charter, and therefore 
for enforcement purposes, not criminal law adjudication.  States also 
expressed concern over a political body (the Security Council) have 
exclusive say over the docket of a judicial institution (the ICC) vis-à-vis 
crime of aggression adjudications.  Alternative positions were that either the 
International Court of Justice or the General Assembly could be involved in 
making the initial determination of whether a state act of aggression had 
occurred, before triggering an ICC case.
44
   These alternatives, however, 
eventually fell to the wayside.  The other key competing position became 
that the ICC could simply decide itself whether there had been a state act of 
aggression—that there need be no other body making this determination.  
Another key issue entering into the Review Conference negotiations was 
which amendment procedure would be used to accomplish the 
amendment.
45
    
                                                                                                                            
international law; (iii) the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and (iv) the 
principle in dubio pro reo (a defendant may not be convicted when doubts about guilt 
remain).  
42
 What follows is admittedly a gross simplification of the many positions articulated, 
but it distills some of the key issues and concerns. 
43
 See U.N. Charter, art. 39 (emphasis added). 
44
 See, e.g., International Criminal Court, Assembly of States Parties, Report of the 
Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression, ICC Doc. ICC-ASP/7/20/Add.1, 
Annex II (Feb. 9-13, 2009) (draft proposal still listing the General Assembly and 
International Court of Justice as options for consideration). 
45
 While it is beyond the scope of this essay to fully discuss this issue, the primary 
competing positions were whether the amendment should be accomplished using Rome 
Statute article 121(4) or 121(5). Article 121(4) would have provided that the amendment 
would enter into force after ratification by seven-eighths of States Parties, and then bind all 
State Parties.  See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 121(4).  Article 121(5) states:  
Any amendment to articles 5, 6, 7 and 8 of this Statute shall enter into 
force for those States Parties which have accepted the amendment one 
year after the deposit of their instruments of ratification or acceptance. In 
respect of a State Party which has not accepted the amendment, the Court 
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This essay will highlight a few key features of the jurisdictional 
agreement reached at the Review Conference. 
 
1.  Security Council or ICC as “Trigger” Mechanisms 
First, in terms of the question of the Security Council or another body 
(or no other body) making an initial determination that there had been a 
state “act of aggression,” two provisions were adopted at the Review 
Conference.  Under new article 15ter, the Security Council may refer a 
situation of suspected aggression to the ICC.
46
   But another mechanism was 
also agreed upon: under new article 15bis, the case may be triggered by 
State Party referral or the Prosecutor’s own proprio motu initiation, coupled 
by ICC Pre-Trial Division review.
47
   This outcome is designed to at least 
partly satisfy supporters of both of the two primary competing positions—
both the Security Council and the ICC (with Pre-Trial Division 
authorization) would be able to make the initial determination.
48
  
                                                                                                                            
shall not exercise its jurisdiction regarding a crime covered by the 
amendment when committed by that State Party's nationals or on its 
territory. 
Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 121(5).  The ultimate resolution adopting the crime of 
aggression amendment states that the  amendment is under article 121(5). See Resolution 
RC/Res.6, supra note 2, at para.1 (the amendment “shall enter into force in accordance 
with article 121, paragraph 5”). There is, however, still some lack of clarity as to how the 
amendment process is to occur.  For a discussion of competing views, see Beth van 
Schaack, Entry Into Force of Aggression Amendments, INTLAWGRRLS (May 5, 2011, 5:04 
AM), http://intlawgrrls.blogspot.com/ 2011/05 /entry-into-force-of-aggression.html and 
responding post,  Jennifer Trahan, Construing Consent: ICC Amendments on the Crime of 
Aggression,  INTLAWGRRLS (August 2, 2011, 5:10 AM), http://intlawgrrls. blogspot. com 
/2011/08/construing-consent-icc-amend ments-on.html. 
46
 See New Def., supra note 30, art. 15ter, para. 1 (“The Court may exercise 
jurisdiction over the crime of aggression in accordance with article 13, paragraph (b), 
subject to the provisions of this article”). Importantly, if the Security Council makes the 
initial determination, it would in no way bind the ICC, which would conduct its own de 
nuovo review as to whether the act of states of aggression had occurred. See New Def., 
supra note 30, art. 15ter, para. 4 (“A determination of an act of aggression by an organ 
outside the Court shall be without prejudice to the Court’s own findings under this 
Statute.”). This provision was seen as extremely important for preserving the ICC’s judicial 
independence, and protecting the rights of the accused by maintaining the presumption of 
innocence and the burden of proof upon the prosecution. See, e.g., June 2006 Princeton 
Meeting, in THE PRINCETON PROCESS, supra note 27, at 151 (“Many participants voiced a 
strong preference for a determination [made by an outside organ] that was open for review 
by the Court, in particular in order to safeguard the defendant’s right to due process. The 
Prosecutor would bear the burden of proof regarding all elements of the crime, including 
the existence of an act of aggression . . . .”). 
47
 New Def., supra note 30, art. 15bis, paras. 6-8. 
48
 Under article 15ter, the Security Council would serve as both the referral mechanism 
and the “filter” mechanism, but under article 15bis, a State Party or the Prosecutor would 
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2. Exclusion of Non-States Parties from Jurisdiction 
A second key feature of the jurisdictional regime agreed upon is that the 
nationals of, and the crimes committed in the territory of, non-States Parties 
are completely excluded from ICC crime of aggression jurisdiction for 
purposes of State Party referral or Prosecutor proprio motu action.
49
   The 
exclusion would not impact Security Council referrals. This means that the 
U.S. (as a non-States Party to the Rome Statute) will be completely 
insulated from the ICC’s crime of aggression jurisdiction (even when it 
commences) as to its national and crimes committed in its territory.  While 
the exclusion only covers State Party referrals and Prosecutor initiated 
actions, because the U.S. sits as a permanent member on the U.N. Security 
Council, it will be effectively insulated from Security Council referrals as 
well, due to its ability to exercise veto power over substantive votes. 
The exclusion of non-States Parties is even more comprehensive than 
the current exclusion of non-State Parties in the Rome Statute.  The 
aggression exclusion would exclude from jurisdiction (a) the nationals of a 
non-State Party even if they commit a crime in the territory of a State Party; 
and (b) the nationals of a State Party even if they commit a crime in the 
territory of a non-State Party—neither of which is the case under the 
original Rome Statute.
50
    
While certain States Parties no doubt viewed this exclusion of non-
States Parties from ICC crime of aggression jurisdiction as unfortunate (or 
even reprehensible) in placing them above the rule of law, other states 
supported it, and the exclusion likely was critical to reaching agreement on 
the Kampala negotiations.
51
   
 
 
 
                                                                                                                            
serve as the referral mechanism and the Pre-Trial Division would serve as the filter. 
49
 New Def., art. 15bis, para. 5 provides: “In respect of a State that is not a party to this 
Statute, the Court shall not exercise its jurisdiction over the crime of aggression when 
committed by that State’s nationals or on its territory.” 
50
 See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 12(2)(a)-(b) (for the crimes of genocide, war 
crimes, and crimes against humanity, jurisdiction is created: (1) over crimes committed in 
the territory of a State Partyeven if committed by a national of a non-State Party, and (2) 
over crimes committed by nationals of a State Partyeven if committed in the territory of 
a non-State Party). 
51
 The ultimate amendment, as noted above, was adopted by consensus.  Thus, 
consensus could have been blocked by any one State Party (such as the U.K. or France) had 
the exclusion of non-States Parties from jurisdiction (apparently insisted on by several 
states) not been included. Observations and discussion of the author at the Review 
Conference. 
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3. “Opt Out” Declarations for States Parties 
A third feature of the jurisdictional regime is that even States Parties 
will be able to avoid aggression jurisdiction by exercising an “opt out” 
declaration.
52
 Again, there are no doubt differing views on the merits of this 
provision. The bottom line is that states will have control over whether or 
not to agree to the ICC’s jurisdictional regime as to the crime of 
aggression—whether to (a) remain a non-State Party (and thus outside the 
Rome Statute system), or (b) exercise an “opt out” declaration (thereby 
staying within the Rome Statute system vis-à-vis the crimes of genocide, 
war crimes and crimes against humanity, but avoiding crime of aggression 
jurisdiction, at least temporarily).
53
     
 
4.  Start Date Delayed 
Fourth, a final significant aspect about the jurisdictional regime agreed 
upon is that none of this will start immediately.  Before ICC crime of 
aggression jurisdiction may commence:  (1) 30 States Parties must ratify the 
aggression amendment; (2) one year must pass after the 30th ratification; 
and (3) there must be one more vote before the ASP that passes either by 
two-thirds or consensus, to occur no sooner than January 2, 2017.
54
      
 
III. ASSESSING THE OUTCOME 
Emerging from the Review Conference negotiations, there is now a 
concrete definition of the crime of aggression.  Even if state actions are not 
technically covered by ICC aggression jurisdiction—certainly the case until 
2017, and even the case beyond then vis-à-vis non-States Parties and States 
Parties that exercise “opt out” declarations55—the definition may 
nonetheless prove significant.  It may help create moral pressure against 
state uses of aggressive force that are neither authorized by the Security 
                                                 
52
 Article 15bis, para. 4 provides: “The Court may, in accordance with article 12, 
exercise jurisdiction over a crime of aggression, arising from an act of aggression 
committed by a State Party, unless that State Party has previously declared that it does not 
accept such jurisdiction by lodging a declaration with the Registrar. . . .” New Def., supra 
note 30, art. 15bis, para. 4. 
53
 The text of the amendment suggests that a State Party exercising an opt out 
declaration would need to re-consider within three years of its initial filing whether to still 
retain the opt-out declaration.  See New Def., supra note 30, art. 15bis, para. 4 (“The 
withdrawal of such a declaration may be effected at any time and shall be considered by the 
State Party within three years.”). New Def., supra note 30, art. 15bis, para. 4. 
54
 See New Def., supra note 30, art. 15bis, paras. 2-3; id., art. 15ter, paras. 2-3. 
55
 The exclusion of non-States Parties and the use of opt out declarations would only 
prevent State Party referrals and cases initiated by the Prosecutor, but not those referred by 
the Security Council. See New Def., supra note 30, art. 15bis. 
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Council, individual or collective self-defense, nor humanitarian in nature.  
The definition also creates a clear “benchmark” against which, in the future, 
to evaluate state uses of force.  After January 1, 2017, there may be actual 
ICC jurisdiction, thus potentially providing a more concrete deterrent 
against aggressive uses of force for states subject to crime of aggression 
jurisdiction.   
It remains to be seen which States Parties will ratify the amendment 
and/or exercise “opt out” declarations, so how much jurisdiction the ICC 
will eventually be able to exercise as to the crime of aggression (particularly 
regarding State Party referrals and Prosecutor initiations) is still unclear.  
Certainly, once Security Council referrals are able to commence, that has 
the potential to create broader deterrence, as it will not depend on which 
countries have ratified the amendment or exercised opt out declarations, but 
this deterrence would not be effective vis-à-vis permanent members of the 
Security Council (or their closest allies), due to the ability of permanent 
members to veto referrals.
56
   
The U.S. negotiating team in Kampala, and prior thereto, was clearly 
skeptical of the definition, and no doubt even more skeptical about the 
whole endeavor of activating the ICC crime of aggression.
57
   States Parties 
that had participated in over ten years of negotiations on the definition and 
many of whom strongly supported reaching an outcome in Kampala that 
would include both a definition as well as conditions for the exercise of 
jurisdiction, were not, however, willing to reopen issues already resolved 
                                                 
56
 The existence of a concrete definition also means that states may incorporate this 
definition into their national criminal codes.  (Indeed, as noted above, some states already 
have some form of crime of aggression in their national codes. See supra note 16.)  Such 
incorporation has the potential to create criminal exposure before national courts through 
territorial exercises of jurisdiction as well as possibly universal jurisdiction.  While the 
possibility of such national court prosecutions could provide positive deterrence and might 
prove beneficial in some instances, there is also a concern about the potential for unfair 
trials.  Some of this concern might be alleviated if there were a relationship of “primacy” 
not “complementarity” between the ICC and national court aggression prosecutions.  A 
“primacy” relationship would favor prosecutions before the ICC, which, with all its 
extensive fair trial protections, might come to be seen as the preferable forum. See Jennifer 
Trahan, Is Complementarity the Right Approach for the International Criminal Court’s 
Crime of Aggression?, CORNELL INT’L.L.J. [forthcoming] 2012; Beth Van Schaak, Par in 
Parem Imperium Non Habet: Complementarity and the Crime of Aggression, INT’L CRIM. 
L. REV [forthcoming] (2012). 
57
 See, e.g., Statement of Harold H. Koh, Legal Advisor, U.S. Department of State, 8
th
 
Resumed Session of the Assembly of State Parties of the International Criminal Court, 
New York (Mar. 23, 2010), available at http://usun.state.gov/briefing/ statements/2010 
/139000.htm (expressing concerns); see also Glennon, supra note 27 (expressing concerns 
with the definition).  But see Trahan, supra note 27 (rebutting various of Glennon’s 
concerns). 
Winter 2012]  ICC CRIME OF AGGRESSION 45 
while the U.S. chose not to attend the negotiations.  In the end, the best the 
U.S. negotiating team could do vis-à-vis the definition was what it did:  
propose a series of “understandings” to accompany the definition, various 
of which were adopted at the Review Conference.
58
    
Because the issue of the conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction was 
still far more unresolved going into the Kampala negotiations, the U.S. 
negotiating team had far more room to engage on this topic.  They clearly 
did so by supporting the exclusion of non-States Parties from the 
jurisdictional regime, although the US does not appear to have been the 
only such supporter.
59
 From the perspective of other states that wanted to 
create a level-playing field for the enforcement of international criminal 
law, the ultimate exclusion of non-States Parties and ability of even States 
Parties to use opt out declarations (at least vis-à-vis State Party referrals and 
Prosecutor proprio motu initiations) was no doubt a less than fully 
satisfactory outcome.  The U.S. negotiating team, while unable to prevent 
the adoption of the amendment entirely (likely a goal), no doubt achieved a 
strong result from its perspective:  the complete exclusion of non-States 
Parties.  Regardless of ones views of the merits of this exclusion—whether 
U.S. leaders should be completely exempt from the jurisdictional regimes—
one positive aspect of the outcome is that the U.S. certainly has no reason to 
withdraw from its current position of constructive engagement with the 
ICC.
60
 
The Review Conference adoption of the crime of aggression was an 
historic accomplishment. The outcome is not necessarily without flaws. 
Which flaws and merits exist from the perspective of states depends in large 
part on whether a state views itself more as a potential aggressor state or a 
potential victim state. Yet, the motivation behind the amendment—to limit 
aggressive use of force that is not sanctioned by the Security Council, 
legitimate individual or collective self-defense or humanitarian in nature—
has the potential to play a significant role in changing state actions at the 
                                                 
58
 For discussion of the understandings proposed by the U.S. and those adopted, see 
Trahan, Kampala Negotiations, supra note 27, at 73–78.  For an interesting discussion of 
the legal effect of the understandings, see Kevin Jon Heller, The Uncertain Legal Status of 
the Aggression Understandings, 10 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 229 (2012). 
59
 A good deal of the negotiations in Kampala did not proceed through open meetings, 
but ones that were closed to NGO participants.  Therefore, some of the details of which 
states insisted on which positions is known only to actual members of the negotiating 
teams, which did not include this author.   
60
 See U.S. Engagement With the International Criminal Court and the Outcome of the 
Recently Concluded Review Conference, Washington, D.C. (June 15, 2010) (statement of 
Harold H. Koh, Legal Advisor, U.S. Department of State, and Stephen J. Rapp, 
Ambassador-at-Large for War Crime Issues), available at http://www.state.gov 
/j/gcj/us_releases/remarks/ 143178.htm (Ambassador Rapp expressing support for ICC 
prosecutions). 
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international level for years to come. 
